Misappropriation Is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury It or Revive It by Sease, Edmund J
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 70 Number 4 Article 1 
1994 
Misappropriation Is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury It or 
Revive It 
Edmund J. Sease 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sease, Edmund J. (1994) "Misappropriation Is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury It or Revive It," 
North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 70 : No. 4 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol70/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
MISAPPROPRIATION IS SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OLD;
SHOULD WE BURY IT OR REVIVE IT?
EDMUND J. SEASE*
I. INTRODUCTION
December 23, 1993 marked the 75th anniversary of International
News Service v. Associated Press. I The I.N.S. case is significant because
the Supreme Court, virtually out of nowhere, adopted a labor theory of
intellectual property to create the "misappropriation doctrine." The
doctrine is so elusive that lower courts have had difficulty in even stating
its elements. The Supreme Court, acting under the guise of federal
common law, recognized a cause of action for misappropriation of a
competitor's intangible assets, including those that are released to the
public domain without patent, trademark, or copyright protection.
The facts of the case are simple enough. I.N.S. had copied
information from Associated Press news dispatches from Europe that
were published in early edition eastern newspapers. 2 I.N.S. transmitted
the news stories to its subscribers on the West Coast for publication in
competition with Associated Press. 3 I.N.S. did not have its own reporters
in Europe reporting on the First World War news events; instead, it
simply took the Associated Press stories as they were wired and
published in eastern United States papers, and then rewrote and sold
them.4 The news reports were uncopyrighted. 5 The Supreme Court, in
holding for Associated Press, stated its now famous "labor theory" of
intellectual property assets as actionable unfair competition, now
commonly called the misappropriation doctrine:
In doing this defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking
material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money,
and which is salable by complainant for money, and that
defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is
endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of
it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members
* Partner in the Des Moines, Iowa firm of Zarley, McKee, Thomte, Voorhees & Sease. Adjunct
Professor, Drake Law School. B.A. 1964, Drake University; J.D. 1967, Drake University. Member of
the Iowa, Ohio, and Patent Bars. The author would like to thank Greg Gantz, Drake 3L, for his
research assistance, and Dean Harvey S. Perlman. University of Nebraska Law School, for his
critique of a draft of this article.
1. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter I.N.S.].
2. Id. at 231.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 233.
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is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown.
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unautho-
rized interference with the normal operation of complainant's
legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is to
be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit
from those who have earned it to those who have not; with
special advantage to defendant in the competition because of
the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of
gathering the news. The transaction speaks for itself, and a
court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as
unfair competition in business.6
Over the years, this case and this single paragraph have been
examined, critiqued, commended, and condemned by scholars and
judges alike. 7 Some courts have adopted the holding, while others have
flatly rejected it. Many condemn it, saying that letting common law
courts loose with a doctrine this broad and undefined is dangerous.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the doctrine of misappro-
priation and consider whether it should be buried once and for all by
confining it to the graveyard of those cases limited to their facts, or
whether it in fact serves a useful purpose in the high-tech '90s by
providing a remedy where equity and justice demands. Necessarily, such
an analysis involves a balancing of federal and state rights, and
consideration of the public policy favoring unfettered competition in
ideas voluntarily placed in the public domain. This article examines the
origins of the misappropriation doctrine, the debate over the worth of the
doctrine, its federal and state history, and finally recommends an
approach which may assist in analysis of misappropriation cases.
6. I.N.S., 248 U.S. at 239-40.
7. See W. Edward Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition. 11 VAND. L.
REV. 483, 496-99 (1958); James A. Rahl, The Right to "Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 56
(1962) [hereinafter Rahl]; Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and The Legacy of
International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1983); Howard B. Abrams,
Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law
Protection, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 509, 513-575; C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the
Misappropriation Doctrine: Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J.
55 (1987); Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual
Property Law, 75 MINN. L REv. 875 (1991); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U.
DAYTON L REV. 884 (1992); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. R EV. 149 (1992); J. THOMAS M CCARTHY, McCARTHEY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 10.23 - .34 (3d ed. 1992).
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF MISAPPROPRIATION
A. THE ELEMENTS OF THE TORT
Most courts that have adopted misappropriation do so after quoting
the famous paragraph of I.N.S. followed by their own reiteration of the
elements of the tort. Typical, and as articulate as any, is the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Mercury Record Productions, Inc., v. Economic
Consultants, Inc.,8 wherein the court said: "The elements of the
misappropriation cause of action developed in I.N.S. are: (1) time, labor,
and money expended in the creation of the thing appropriated; (2)
competition; and (3) commercial damage to the plaintiff."9
Even the most casual examination of the elements of the tort as
routinely articulated indicates the breadth of the doctrine. The tort
cannot possibly be limited to the three elements listed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. For example, the above-listed elements do not take into
account whether the asset misappropriated is in fact something
voluntarily placed in the public domain. Nor do they take into account
that if the intellectual property asset is not protectible under federal
patent, trademark, or copyright laws, it may be that federal preemption
would preclude state law protection. The simple statement of the
doctrine also ignores the fact that in any educated technological society,
all intellectual asset creations necessarily build upon the education,
technology, and creations of forerunners. 10 As one author has put it,
"our economy would still be in the Dark Ages if independent creation
were the only circumstance under which competing alternatives could be
offered."I" For example, we all learn language by mimicry. Likewise,
today's rocket scientists use theories of yesterday's scientific giants like
Sir Isaac Newton. Thus, the tort of misappropriation must involve
consideration of more than just the taking of another's labor.
The law must recognize the difference between tangible property
and its appropriation and appropriation of information, knowledge, and
intangible property. Such intangible property, unlike physical property,
can be simultaneously used by many. The question therefore becomes
whether or not society should exclude simultaneous use by many, and if
8. 218 N.W.2d 705 (Wis. 1974).
9. Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc.. 218 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Wis. 1974).
10. See NICHOLAS HAASZ, NOBEL, 248 (Orion Press 1959), ("It is quite natural that a dwarf on
the shoulders of a giant should see farther than the giant." (quoting Lord Justice Kay of the House of
Lords in a patent infringement case on dynamite)).
11. Rahl, supra note 7, at 72..
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it does, what are the consequences of treating intangible property as
exclusively under the control of one?
Consider, for example, application of the elements of misappro-
priation as enunciated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to a modem day
copy of Michaelangelo's "David." Everyone that has made and used
such a copy could be potentially liable to Michaelangelo's heirs, since
the elements of misappropriation are met! It is therefore clear that there
must be additional elements to the tort of misappropriation beyond those
enunciated in decisions like the Wisconsin Supreme Court's.
B. THE "REAL" ELEMENTS OF THE TORT
The author proposes that the elements of misappropriation should
be the following:
(1) Plaintiff has created its asset through considerable expenditure
of time, labor, and skill;
(2) Defendant has appropriated plaintiff's asset without expend-
iture of time, labor, and skill to frustrate plaintiff's primary purpose in
creation of the asset;
(3) Defendant has competed with plaintiff;
(4) Defendant's appropriation has caused commercial damage to
plaintiff;
(5) Relief is not available to plaintiff through other traditionally
recognized unfair competition doctrines; and
(6) There is no federal preemption.
While no case has specifically stated these six elements in the above
manner, many modem cases undergo an analysis that includes these six
factors, even if some are left unstated. 12 As demonstrated below, if new
cases are analyzed in light of these six factors, courts would have
sufficient discretion to reach proper conclusions without being turned
loose with a broad, undefined doctrine that could hinder both techno-
logical advancement and competition.
C. THE DEBATE
The debate over the viability of the doctrine of misappropriation
began early in its life. Judge Learned Hand crystallized the debate as
12. See, e.g., United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys. Data Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1035
(3d Cir. 1984) (pointing out that misappropriation is flexible and often fills the gap left by other unfair
competition torts).
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early as 1929. In Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,13 he began his
lifelong battle with J.N.S..
In Cheney Bros., the competitor had copied the plaintiff's popular
design of silks and had undercut the plaintiffs price. 14 The design was
not protected by either patent or copyright.15 The evidence showed that
the design would be popular for only a single season and then the
public's fancy would turn to a new design. 16 The plaintiff sought to rely
on I.N.S., to which Judge Learned Hand responded:
Of the cases on which the plaintiff relies, the chief is Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.
Ct. 68, 63 L. Ed. 211, 2 A. L. R. 293. Although that
concerned another subject-matter-printed news disp
atches-we agree that, if it meant to lay down a general
doctrine, it would cover this case; at least, the language of the
majority opinion goes so far. We do not believe that it did.
While it is of course true that law ordinarily speaks in general
terms, there are cases where the occasion is at once the
justification for, and the limit of, what is decided. This appears
to us such an instance; we think that no more was covered than
situations substantially similar to those then at bar. The
difficulties of understanding it otherwise are insuperable. We
are to suppose that the court meant to create a sort of
common-law patent or copyright for reasons of justice. Either
would flagrantly conflict with the scheme which Congress has
for more than a century devised to cover the subject-matter.
Qua patent, we should at least have to decide, as tabula
rasa, whether the design or machine was new and required
invention; further, we must ignore the Patent Office whose
action has always been a condition upon the creation of this
kind of property. Qua copyright, although it would be simpler
to decide upon the merits, we should equally be obliged to
dispense with the conditions imposed upon the creation of the
right. Nor, if we went so far, should we know whether the
property so recognized should be limited to the periods
prescribed in the statutes, or should extend as long as the
author's grievance. It appears to us incredible that the Supreme
Court should have had in mind any such consequences. To
13. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
19941 785
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exclude others from the enjoyment of a chattel is one thing; to
prevent any imitation of it, to set up a monopoly in the plan of
its structure, gives the author a power over his fellows vastly
greater, a power which the Constitution allows only Congress to
create.1 7
Consistent with Judge Learned Hand's view, the Second Circuit
routinely limited I.N.S. to its own peculiar facts, always distinguishing it
on one ground or another. 18 Thus, the early judicial battle lines were
drawn only eleven years after the birth of the misappropriation doctrine.
To varying degrees, the views expressed by the Supreme Court in
I.N.S. and Judge Learned Hand in Cheney Bros. have shaped the law for
the last seventy-five years. Initially, the cases were mostly federal since
the adoption of the misappropriation doctrine was federal common law.
However, when Erie Railroad v. Tompkinsl 9 abolished federal common
law, the focus shifted to state courts.
III. THE SIX ERA HISTORY OF MISAPPROPRIATION
A. WHY Six ERAS?
The study of state law doctrines and their interrelationship with
federal law as well as their viability fluctuate as the Supreme Court
changes its view of the relationship of state and federal power. Thus, the
history of the misappropriation doctrine can be conveniently segmented
into six eras highlighted by benchmark Supreme Court decisions. Those
eras are: (1) the federal common law era of 1918-1938; (2) the
post-Erie era of 1938-1964; (3) the SearslCompco2O era of 1964-1973;
(4) the Goldstein2l or tape piracy era of 1973-1978; (5) the copyright
preemption or section 30122 era of 1978-1991; and finally, (6) the
Feist23 era of 1991 to date. The six era history of the misappropriation
doctrine is examined below, highlighting some of the more important
cases in each era.
17. Cheney Bros., 35 F.2d 279, 280.
18. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman. 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1952) (denying misappropriation
when defendant copied all of a book on which the copyright had expired); National Comics
Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951).
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
21. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
23. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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B. THE BEGINNING: 1918-1938
In its youth, the doctrine of misappropriation developed slowly.
Few of the early federal cases refined the articulated elements of the
doctrine beyond the broad statements of the Supreme Court in I.N.S.
The earlier courts showed a reluctance to extend the doctrine to copying
unpatented devices voluntarily placed in the public domain 24 or to
unpatented business systems. 25 More success occurred in applying the
misappropriation doctrine to cases involving performance appropri-
ation26 or news appropriation. 27
By way of example, early cases involving copying of unpatented
devices, such as electrical contacts,28 parts of an Auto-lite system,29 and a
business advertising system for movie theaters, 30 generally distinguished
I.N.S. as involving elements of fraud, palming off, or unfair interference
with customer relationships, each of which was noted to be absent in the
facts before the present court. The early cases did not raise issues of
federal preemption since they were applying federal law.
In early attempts to use misappropriation in cases involving
activities of classic unfair competition, which might be easily classified as
trademark infringement or palming off, plaintiffs did little better than in
the unpatented device cases.3 1 Thus, in a 1921 harbinger of things to
come, Judge Learned Hand refused to apply misappropriation to the
New York Times to stop it from wrongfully asserting that it had a United
States publication right of materials first published in the London Times,
when in fact another United States newspaper contractually had that
right. 32 As Judge Learned Hand pointed out, a cause of action lies for
24. See Rahl, supra note 7, at 67 nn. 41-50 (citing numerous product cases rejecting the
misappropriation doctrine for steak knives, chocolate Christmas cards, baseball cards, fabric design.
electrical parts. drugs, chinaware, pocket books, garment closures, and business forms).
25. E.g., Puente v. President & Fellows of Harvard College. 248 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1957) (denying
recovery where an idea for foreign tax service was voluntarily and publicly disclosed).
26. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station. Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937) (broadcasting of records
contrary to limited license), Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), affd, 279 App. Div. 632. 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951) (bootleg recordings of radio
broadcasts of the opera).
27. Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd, 80 F.2d 575 (1934);
Veatch v. Wagner, 109 F. Supp. 537 (D. Alaska 1953) (reading plaintiffs news over the radio).
28. Harvey Hubbell, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 262 F. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
29. Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 8 F. Supp. 314 (E.D.N.Y. 1934).
30. Affiliated Enters. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936).
31. See Speedry Prods., Inc. v. Dri-Mark Prods.. Inc.. 271 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1959) for an
excellent example of this distinction and a discussion of palming off.
32. Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275 F. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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such statements if they are outright false as claimed, and one need not
resort to the I.N.S. case.33
In other cases involving clear take-offs on the name of Coca Cola, 34
product packaging simulation, 35 and taxi cab design appearance, 36 the
courts had no trouble finding that the defendant had clearly wronged the
plaintiff. However, the courts nearly always found some form of
traditional unfair competition and then cited I.N.S. as a buttress for their
reasoning, indicating the famous language that the defendant had tried
to "reap where [he] ha[d] not sown."37 In reality these were not true
misappropriation cases but traditionally recognizable unfair competition
for wrongs such as palming off, trademark infringement, and trade dress
appropriation.
Early successes in true misappropriation cases frequently involved
appropriation of either performance rights38 or news. 3 9 Thus, the
Pittsburgh Pirates successfully prevented a broadcaster from observing
their games from over a fence and then re-broadcasting them.40 Other
examples include a news subscription service preventing another news
service from publishing its confidential reports; 41 and an eavesdropping,
unlicensed ringside announcer at Joe Lewis fights seated next to a
licensed ringside announcer was prevented from re-broadcasting what he
heard as "hot news tips." 42 The similarity to the original I.N.S. facts in
each instance is apparent since these involved news information of
limited time value voluntarily placed before the public. No doubt relief
was granted because conventional intellectual property torts were a poor
fit. No patent, copyright, or trademark was involved, and the intellectual
property had voluntarily been placed before the public so there was no
trade secret type of taking. Traditional unfair competition failed
because of a lack of palming off or misrepresentation of goods or
services.
Fashion design cases also occurred in the first twenty years of the
doctrine. Indeed, Judge Learned Hand's famous critique of the
33. Id. at 565.
34. Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 F. 600 (4th Cir. 1921).
35. Pro-Phy-lac-tic Brush v. Abraham & Strauss, 11 F. Supp. 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).
36. Checker Cab Mfg. Corp. v. Sweeny, 197 N.Y.S. 284 (1922).
37. IN.S., 248 U.S. 215,239-40 (1918).
38. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (peeking
over a fence and broadcasting Pittsburgh Pirate baseball games).
39. F.W. Dodge Corp. v. Comstock, 251 N.Y.S. 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931) (finding
misappropriation when defendant republished plaintiff's construction news reports as its own).
40. Pittsburgh Athletic, 24 F. Supp. at 494.
41. F.W. Dodge Co., 251 N.Y.S. at 172.
42. Twentieth Century Sporting Club v. Transradio Press Serv., 300 N.Y.S. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1937).
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misappropriation doctrine occurred in Cheney Bros., a fashion design
case.43 However, other fashion design cases, granted relief under similar
facts. For example, in Margolis v. National Bellas Hess Co. ,44 LN.S. was
used successfully. 45 There the court pointed out that the design was not
thrown upon the market so as to be the property of the public by a
simple showing to a prospective purchaser who did not purchase the
fashion line, but later copied the design.46
By the end of the first twenty years after I.N.S., misappropriation
had been adopted as the law in Missouri, Texas, New York and
Pennsylvania. Missouri adopted misappropriation in a case which
prevented a hotel from using its jacket covers to cover a telephone
book's advertising as sold by the publisher of the telephone book.47
Texas adopted misappropriation in a case involving unauthorized
re-publication of news items gathered by the owner at great expense. 48
New York adopted misappropriation in a series of cases,49 and Pennsyl-
vania, in its famous Fred Waring case. 50 In Waring v. WDAS Broad-
casting Station. Inc. 51 a defendant was prevented from copying (then
uncopyrightable) performances of Fred Waring and his Pennsylvanians
embodied in phonographs that indicated on labels "not licensed for
radio broadcast." 52 The defendant used the records, despite the labels,
for broadcasting radio performances so as to compete with Fred Waring's
live performances. 53 The Court adopted I.N.S. as Pennsylvania law,
pointing out that the "publication" of the orchestra's renditions was not a
dedication of them to the public, but was only for use as phonographs
and not to compete with plaintiff's live performances. 54
In the first twenty years after I.N.S., only Judge Learned Hand
forthrightly articulated the potential problems with a broad labor theory
of intellectual property as set forth in I.N.S.. Other courts at best skirted
the edges, indicating, sometimes rather flimsily, either why the initial
43. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
44. 249 N.Y.S. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931).
45. Margolis v. National Bellas Hess Co.. 249 N.Y.S. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931).
46. Id. at 179.
47. National Tel. Director Co. v. Dawson Mfg. Co.. 263 S.W. 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924).
48. See, e.g. Gilmore v. Sammons, 269 S.W. 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
49. The list of New York cases is too long to fully cite, but the New York Courts applied
misappropriation to such varied circumstances as rebroadcasts and use of a Madision Square Garden
look-a-like in the movies. See, e.g., F.W. Dodge Corp. v. Comstock, 251 N.Y.S. 172 (N.Y. App. Div.
1931) (finding misappropriation when defendant republished plaintiff's construction reports as its
own).
50. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station. Inc.. 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
51. 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
52. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station. Inc., 194 A. 631. 633 (Pa. 1937).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 638.
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work was not truly placed in the public domain or why I.N.S. was
distinguishable upon its facts. Clearly, in the early days the labor theory
of intellectual property was useful in those cases where the law had not
yet fashioned a clear remedy. 55 It was also useful in those cases where
the natural rights of an individual to his own intellectual property had
somehow been offended to the economic benefit of a defendant. 56
Largely, the decisional successes of plaintiffs came in those areas in
which the law had not otherwise fashioned a remedy and in which the
plaintiff, if left unprotected, would lose incentive to continue with present
commercial practices. None of the early cases involved serious
preemption issues because they were federal cases. However, with the
United States Supreme Court decision in 1938 abolishing federal
common law, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,57 courts now had to deal
with misappropriation as a state law doctrine. After Erie, federal pre-
emption and the reasoning of Judge Learned Hand in Cheney Bros.
could not be ignored.
C. THE DEVELOPING LAW AFTER ERIE: 1938-1964
The twenty-six years between Erie (1938) and Sears/Compco
(1964) contributed surprisingly little to the substantive refinement of
either the doctrine of misappropriation or the arguments against it.
I.N.S. was the benchmark case for those courts accepting misappro-
priation and Cheney Bros. was the benchmark case for the courts
rejecting misappropriation.
Judge Learned Hand continued what he started in Cheney Bros.,
rejecting the doctrine at every opportunity. 58 At best, his pronounce-
ments limited I.N.S. to its peculiar facts and he then found reasons why
the case at bar differed; but this was only when he was kind to the
doctrine. In other instances, such as RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,59 he
concluded exactly opposite of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the
Fred Waring case. 6 0 In RCA, he denied recovery premised upon I.N.S.
when RCA sought to prevent radio broadcasts of recorded record
performances, an area in which the copyright law had not yet chosen to
55. See, e.g., Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1938) (involving a look-alike impression of the arena created without permission).
56. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938)
(involving peeking over a fence and broadcasting baseball games).
57. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
58. See supra note 18 (citing cases in which Judge Learned Hand rejected the doctrine of
misappropriation).
59. 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
60. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
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provide a remedy.6 1 In denying recovery to RCA he emphasized the
voluntary placement of the performance in the hands of the public and
characterized the Pennsylvania decision as one where a legend on the
records "affixed a servitude upon the discs in the hands of any buyer." 62
He again warned that L.N.S. must be confined to its own fact situation.63
Other Judge Learned Hand decisions of this era denied any
misappropriation remedy in instances such as copying nearly all of a
book when the copyright had expired, 64 and copying the uncopyrighted
Superman and Captain Marvel characters. 65 His emphasis in each
instance was upon the voluntary placement of the intellectual property in
the hands of the public without benefit of the protection of patent or
copyright.
In the early post-Erie cases, some courts continued their federal law
analysis without addressing the issue of whether the law of the relevant
state recognized the misappropriation doctrine.66 The cases that did
make the specific analysis varied from adopting I.N.S. enthusiastically
(New York) to flatly rejecting it (Massachusettes). 67 Courts denied relief
upon a misappropriation theory for copying uncopyrighted car
dealership accounting forms, 68 for copying uncopyrighted race horse
news information sheets, 69 for compensating Glenn Miller's estate for use
of his labor, expenses, and services in giving live performances to benefit
the selling of records,70 and for making phonographic reproductions of
uncopyrighted Gregorian chants. 71 In one interesting case, a plaintiff
was successful in using I.N.S. to enjoin the defendant from publishing an
answer book to problems initially posed in the plaintiff's physics
textbook.7 2  Some courts emphasized that there must be competition
61. Id. at 90.
62. Id. at 89.
63. Id. at 90.
64. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952).
65. National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
66. E.g., Reynolds & Reynolds v. Norick, 114 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1940).
67. Triangle Publications, Inc. V. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198.
203-04 (D. Mass. 1942).
68. See Reynolds & Reynolds, 114 F.2d at 278.
69. See Triangle Publications, 46 F. Supp. at 200-01.
70. Walsh v. Radio Corp. of Am.. 275 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1960).
71. Desclee & Cie, S.A. v. Nemmers, 190 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
72. Addison-Wessley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 207 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
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between the parties as a prerequisite to I.N.S. relief,73 while others
emphasized a view that some form of deception must occur. 74
Of particular interest in differentiating between unfair competition
cases involving deception and true misappropriation is Speedry
Products, Inc. v. Dri-Mark Products, Inc. 75 In Speedry, the plaintiff
produced "Magic Marker" marking devices. 76 Defendant imported
similar devices and was sued for patent infringement, trademark
infringement, and unfair competition. 77 The court denied relief under
I.N.S., saying the case was sui generis, but in so doing pointed to
important differences between traditional palming off and true
misappropriation:
Because of [the] failure to recognize the distinctions between
the palming off cases and the misappropriation cases, both of
which categories are generally regarded as falling within the
field of unfair competition, much confusion has crept into the
state decisions and thence into the federal decisions. It is due
to that confusion that courts occasionally have said that
secondary meaning is not a necessary factor without restricting
that observation to the misappropriation cases in which
recovery seems not to depend upon the confusion or deceit of
the public. Thus in such of these misappropriation cases as did
not involve a palming off, there was a certain logic in saying
that proof of a secondary meaning for a plaintiffs service or
product is not essential for recovery. 78
The point is well taken. Misappropriation does not involve
confusion analysis or secondary meaning analysis. Rather, the questions
are far simpler, namely, the plaintiffs use of his/her own labor to create
intellectual property, the defendant's "reaping where he has not sown,"
the plaintiff and the defendant competing, and damage to the plaintiff.
Secondary meaning, source confusion, and general trademark type
analyses which are wholly appropriate for palming off and source
indicia cases are wholly inappropriate for misappropriation analysis.
Instead, misappropriation focuses upon the labor in creating intellectual
73. For example, see the district court opinion in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787,
793 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 114 F.2d 86 (1939)). The apparent theory is that misappropriation is part of the
law of unfair competition, and therefore implies that competition must exist.
74. See, e.g., Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. Norick, 114 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1940) (noting the lack
of attempt to mislead in defendant's simulation of plaintiffs uncopyrighted forms).
75. 271 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1959).
76. Speedry Prods., Inc. v. Dri-Mark Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1959).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 650.
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property and the wrong in appropriating the creator's labors without
compensation.
As 1964 approached and along with it the important federal
preemption companion cases of Sears/Compco, it was clear that
misappropriation was alive and well, especially in New York. Only
Massachusetts (in a federal case) had rejected it. Generally, plaintiffs'
successes occurred in the unique cases that did not force the court to
deal with the tension between public domain concepts of the patent and
copyright law and the labor theory of intellectual property. However,
Judge Learned Hand recognized the inevitable conflict in these difficult
issues in Cheney Bros., which he again emphasized and expounded upon
in RCA v. Whiteman. His view apparently was that no case except I.N.S.
itself was appropriate for misappropriation.
The clash between states' rights of protection for intellectual
property of their citizens and doctrines of federal preemption of the
patent and copyright laws predicted by Judge Learned Hand occurred in
1964 with the companion cases of Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,7 9
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc..80 In Sears, based upon
doctrines of federal preemption, the Supreme Court held that Illinois
could not, under the guise of regulating unfair competition, grant what
was in effect patent protection for items that under the patent law were
not patentable.8' In Compco, the Court followed its holding in Sears and
prevented Illinois from providing relief to a plaintiff where the
defendant had copied an unpatentable light fixture.8 2 In both Sears and
Compco, the design patent in question had been held invalid. In its now
famous quote the Sears Court said:
Thus the patent system is one in which uniform federal
standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the
same time preserving free competition. Obviously, a State
could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration
date or give a patent on an article which lacked the level of
invention required for federal patents. To do either would run
counter to the policy of Congress of granting patents only to
true inventions, and then only for a limited time. Just as a State
cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it
cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair
79. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
80. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
81. Sears. 376 U.S. at 232.
82. Compco. 376 U.S. at 237-38.
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competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the
objectives of the federal patent laws. 8 3
Continuing, however, the Court ended its opinion with an important
caveat:
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require
that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that
other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from
being misled as to the source, just as it may protect businesses
in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the
packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such
markings, from misleading purchasers as to the source of the
goods. But because of the federal patent laws, a State may not,
when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the
copying of the article itself or award damages for such
copying. Cf. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 916
(2nd Cir. 1952). The judgment below did both and in so
doing gave Stiffel the equivalent of a patent monopoly on its
unpatented lamp. That was error, and Sears is entitled to a
judgment in its favor.84
Interestingly, the Supreme Court cited the Ricordi case, a 1952
Judge Learned Hand opinion which denied I.N.S. type relief for the
virtual total copying of a book. The citation of Judge Learned Hand's
rejection of I.N.S. misappropriation for copying of an uncopyrighted
work at least suggests that Sears/Compco might have some significant
impact on the doctrine of misappropriation. However, the cryptic last
paragraph of Sears did little to assist in determining the line between
legitimate state interests and federal preemption for granting the
equivalent of a patent monopoly.85
D. THE SEARs/CoMPco AFTERMATH
The preemption doctrine of SearslCompco is still having a dramatic
effect on unfair competition law, thirty years later.8 6 The level of its
effect ebbs and flows as the Supreme Court swings the pendulum of
federal preemption from side to side. In 1964, the effect of Sears
83. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230-31.
84. 1d. at 232-33.
85. Id.
86. Sears is routinely cited as a starting point in federal preemption cases. See, e.g., Synercom
Technology v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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/Compco on the doctrine of misappropriation was immediate. Unfortu-
nately, it was not a uniform effect.
Within months of the SearslCompco decisions, the Second Circuit
was faced with a trademark case which failed as a registered trademark
cause of action.87 The court, applying New York law, looked at a
broader unfair competition remedy for misappropriation. 88 The Second
Circuit concluded that New York would provide a remedy and in a
footnote concluded that Sears did not preempt the New York cause of
action. 89 The Court cited the last paragraphs of the Sears opinion,
pointing out that states may still protect their legitimate interests in
trademarks, labels, distinctive trade dress, and packaging.90
In contrast, the First Circuit, in a case involving the uncopyrighted
fictional character Paladin, flatly rejected the misappropriation doctrine,
stating that it was no longer authoritative since it was decided as a matter
of general law before the decision in Erie and was overruled by Sears.9 1
The court cited the famous dissent of Judge Learned Hand in Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp..92 Hand's dissent pointed to the
anomaly of allowing a creator to acquire a perpetual monopoly under
state law that one could not enjoy under federal law, as well as the
impossibility of affording effective protection against copying, except by
uniform national laws.93 The views of the First and Second Circuits as to
the effect of Sears/Compco on misappropriation were diametrically
opposed, and other circuit cases also aligned themselves with one side or
the other on the effect of Sears/Compco on misappropriation. 94 Most
courts, however, had the benefit of the next significant Supreme Court
federal preemption decision, Goldstein v. California,95 before they ruled.
87. Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 380 U.S. 913
(1964)).
88. Id. at 780.
89. Id. at 781 n.4.
90. Id.
91. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1007 (1967)). Accord see Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 989 (1964)): Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906
(1970)). Contra see Flexitized, 335 F.2d 774; MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at §§ 10:28 12], [3]
(characterizing the First Circuit view as "minority" and the opposite view the "majority").
92. 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
93. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657. 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J..
dissenting).
94. Federal circuit cases holding that Sears/Compco prevented application of misappropriation
include: Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 377 F.2d at 315: Cable Vision. 335 F.2d at 348: Goodyear Tire.
435 F.2d at 711. Federal Circuit cases holding Sears/Compco did not prevent application of
misappropriation include: Flexitized, 335 F.2d at 774; but cf. Riback Enterprises, Inc. v. Denham, 452
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1971) (reversing an injunction of unpatented displays stand).
95. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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Goldstein clearly represents a retreat from the sweeping view of federal
preemption expressed in SearslCompco.
E. THE GOLDSTEIN OR TAPE PIRACY ERA: 1973-1978
Goldstein v. California involved a California statute that prohibited
tape piracy. 96 At the time of adoption of the California statute, the
federal copyright laws did not cover acts of tape piracy as copyright
infringement. Tape piracy was therefore prevalent in the country. Until
Congress amended the copyright laws, the matter of regulation of tape
piracy was left in the hands of the states.
The California statute was attacked on two constitutional grounds.
The first contention was that the statute was the equivalent of a state
copyright of unlimited duration and thus conflicted with the Consti-
tution.97 The second contention was that the state statute was preempted
under the SearslCompco ruling. 98 As to the first issue, the Court stated
that the Constitution neither explicitly precluded the states from granting
copyrights nor handed the authority exclusively to the federal govern-
ment. 99 Thus, the Court concluded that the states had not relinquished
all power to grant authors "the exclusive [r]ight to their respective
[wlritings."O0 As to the argument of preemption under Sears/Compco,
the Court distinguished Sears/Compco, pointing out that in Sears, the
Illinois statute provided protection for specific unpatentable devices
(pole lamps) which were within the public domain, and that in Goldstein,
which dealt with writings (the recordings there involved), there was no
comparable conflict between state law and federal law. 101 Thus, the
Court concluded there was no reason why the state should not be free to
prohibit tape piracy, and it cited LN.S. as authority for the state action.102
Even the dissent in I.N.S. was criticized, with the Court pointing out that
there is no immutable line to tell us which human products are private
property and which are so general as to become "free as the air."103
Goldstein can only be interpreted as breathing new life into the doctrine
of misappropriation since it diminishes the risk of state action being
preempted.
96. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 548.
97. Id. at 551.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 560.
100. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, di. 8).
101. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 570.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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The window of opportunity presented by Goldstein was opened
even further one year later in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.104 In
Kewanee, the Sixth Circuit's holding of federal preemption for a portion
of the Ohio trade secret law was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court. 105 The Court held that states may exercise regulatory power over
discoveries, just as Goldstein held that they could over writings.106
Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented, concluding that the decision was
at war with the philosophy of Sears.'0 7 On this point the dissent would
seem more correct than the majority if one assumes an expansive view of
the concept of public domain, i.e., what is public domain for one
purpose is public domain for all purposes.108
The Court's reasoning as to why there was no true state law conflict
with federal law was disingenuous, at best. Some commentators have
indicated that the Court's enthusiasm for allowing the states to protect
their legitimate interest of commercial morality in business dealings
through enforcement of trade secret law pushed the Kewanee Court to a
contrary decision that in reality is factually indistinguishable from
Sears.'0 9 As Justice Douglas pointed out, the products involved in
Kewanee were sodium iodide crystals that could have been patented, but
were not. 110 Clearly, the collective weight of authority of Goldstein and
Kewanee is that Sears/Compco is not as broadly preemptive as one might
initially think. Thus, after Goldstein and Kewanee, states initially
examining the misappropriation doctrine had the demanding task of
analyzing federal preemption as strongly set forth in Sears/Compco and
as modified by Goldstein and Kewanee.
104. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
105. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974), rev'g 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.
1973).
106. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 478-79.
107. Id. at 495.
108. An expansive view of the public domain concept would not seem justified or consistent with
our legal history. For example, the patent laws speak only in terms of the right to exclude, 35 U.S.C. §
154. and have an absolute requirement for novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102, whereas the typical state trade
secret law, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 550 (West Supp. 1994), refers only to a relative standard of
novelty, i.e., "not generally known." IowA CODE ANN. Ch. 550.2 (West Supp. 1994).
Thus what is public domain for patent law purposes may not be public domain under state trade
secret laws. Note, however, that Justice O'Connor in Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 163-65, seems to
adopt an expansive view of the public domain concept.
109. Note, Bonito Boats' Resurrection of the Preemption Controversy: The Patent Leverage
Charade and the Lanhain Act "End Around," 69 TEX. L. REV. 729 (1991).
110. 416 U.S. at 495.
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F. 17 U.S.C. § 301: 1978-1991
January 1, 1978, marked the effective date of the new copyright
law.Ill It is particularly important that Section 301, Title 17, of the
United States Code legislatively established the extent to which state
copyright law was preempted by federal copyright law: "Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State.""12
Continuing, section 301(b) provides that nothing in the copyright
law limits the rights or remedies under common law doctrines or restricts
the rights of the states to regulate subject matter that does not come
within classes of subject matter specified in the federal statutes as
copyrightable."t 3 Nor does preemption apply to subject matter that is
not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights in the copyright statute. 114
Generally, the courts have held that preemption applies if proof of one
cause of action also proves another cause of action.11 5 On the other
hand, if there are different or extra elements of the cause of action
required for proof, then there is no federal preemption."l 6
Section 301 has had, and will continue to have, an effect upon the
state law doctrine of misappropriation. For example, in Schuchart &
Associates v. Solo Serve Corp.,'17 a Texas court held that use of a
misappropriation theory for copying of architectural plans for shopping
malls was preempted. ''8  Another Texas case with an articulate
examination of the preemption doctrine is Synercom Technology v.
University Computing Co.. 119 In Synercom, the defendant copied a
computer input format directly out of the plaintiff's user's manual. 120
The court recognized that Texas had embraced the doctrine of
misappropriation as early as 1925121 and then commented upon the
111. 17 U.S.C. §301 (1994).
112. Id. § 301(a).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1994).
114. Warner Bros.. Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 247 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that
state law misappropriation claims may be preempted by federal copyright law but not palming off
claims).
115. See MCCARTHEY, supra note 7, §§ 10.30[2] - [3] (discussing the legislative history of 17
U.S.C. § 301, its impact on LN.S., and cases on rights equivalent to copyright).
116. See Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(quoting MELviLLE B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1.01 [B][31, at 1-11-12 (1984)).
117. 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
118. Schuchert & Associates v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 944 (W.D. Tex 1982).
119. 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
120. Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 38-39 (N.D. Tex.
1979).
121. Id. at 39.
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Sears/Compco decisions, saying, "[t]he line between the permissible and
the impermissible exercise of state power has become difficult to
discern." 122 The court then analyzed the modifications of the Sears
doctrine by Goldstein and Kewanee and ultimately concluded that
misappropriation was preempted under the facts of the case. 123
Other less remarkable misappropriation cases in this era prevented
an unauthorized race track's use of the certificates of registration and
eligibility prepared only for use in authorized tracks;124 prevented a
lesser Commodity Exchange from using the Standard & Poor's Index;125
and precluded a manufacturer from cutting off distribution rights when
an area distributor had, through his efforts, created a substantial
distribution list. 126 In another case, a court refused to extend the
rationale of I.N.S. to stop use of the term "air-shuttle" to describe services
between New York and Boston.127
As 1991 approached, it was becoming clearer, at least in the federal
cases, that proper analysis of misappropriation first required a determi-
nation of whether misappropriation was a recognized doctrine in the
relevant state. If recognized, the impact of federal preemption on the
facts of the case at bar had to be taken into account, giving due
consideration to the nature of the intellectual property as compared to
federal patent, trademark, and copyright rights. This analysis began with
the brightline federal preemption doctrine of SearslCompco, followed by
the blurred line modification of Goldstein and Kewanee. Lastly, the
effect of the copyright preemption statute, Section 301, Title 17, of the
United States Code had to be taken into account if the rights were of a
type that arguably could be preempted by statutory copyright law. In
this respect, Judge Higginbotham's decision in Synercom seemed an
appropriate model for all modern day courts to follow. 128 However,
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 129 added yet
another dimension.
122. Id. at 40-41.
123. Id. at 43.
124. United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981).
125. Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc.. 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982).
126. Copy-Data v. Toshiba America, Inc.. 582 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 755 F.2d 293
(1985).
127. Eastern Air Lines v. New York Air Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270. 1280-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
128. Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(setting forth a model analyzing state law, then looking to the effect of federal preemption, beginning
with Sears and moving forward).
129. 499 U.S. 340(1991).
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G. CURRENT TIMES: 1991 (FEIsT) TO TODAY
As of this writing, the last significant Supreme Court decision on
misappropriation and preemption was Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.. 130 Rural published a typical telephone directory.
Feist wanted to publish its own directory covering certain partially
overlapping geographic areas. 131 In so doing, Feist sought permission to
publish some of the listings from Rural's phone book. Rural refused
permission but Feist still published the listings. 132 The Supreme Court
held that Rural's telephone directories did not have the sufficient
minimum level of creativity to be original works133 and also rejected the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine.13 4 The Court concluded that facts, whether
alone or as a part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may
not be copyrighted.1 35 Continuing, the Court noted that "[a] factual
compilation is eligible for copyright [only] if it features an original
selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to the
particular selection or arrangement []" and not to the facts themselves. 136
Interestingly, in justifying its rejection of the sweat of the brow doctrine,
the Court cited I.N.S., 13 7 presumably for the purpose of acknowledging
that even in that case it was recognized that facts alone are not the subject
of copyright.
Clearly, an interesting case would have developed had Feist involved
a claim of misappropriation. One can effectively argue that, since facts
and their compilation are not per se copyrightable, they are therefore not
subject matter of concern under the copyright law, and therefore
preemption does not apply. On the other hand, it can also be argued
that since Feist indicates that compiled facts are in the public domain,
under the federal copyright laws, they should remain in the public
domain, and states cannot grant protective rights of any kind. Thus, one
can argue Feist both ways, proving the truth of Judge Higginbotham's
observation in Synercom: "[T]he line between the permissible and the
impermissible exercise of state power has become difficult to discern." 138
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 361.
133. Id. at 362.
134. Feist, 499 U.S. at 360.
135. Id. at 350-51.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 353-54.
138. Synercoin, 474 F. Supp. at 40-41.
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The impact of federal preemption on misappropriation fact patterns
that are clearly outside the scope of traditional federal rights under
patent, trademark, and copyright laws is the most difficult area of
analysis. Historically, misappropriation proved valuable to stop tape
piracy when it was not copyright infringement to make pirated tapes. 139
It also was used to stop bootleg broadcasts when records were not
copyrightable. 140 Even in I.N.S., misappropriation stopped the copying
of facts which under Feist are not per se protectible. 141 In each of these
instances, the defendant had clearly benefited from the plaintiff's
intellectual labors, thus fitting the misappropriation doctrine.
Following this line of reasoning, it can be argued that if the
intangible intellectual property is beyond the reach of federal law,
misappropriation may be an appropriate form of state intellectual
property law relief. Feist, therefore, raises as many questions as it
answers in determining the role of preemption in cases relating to
writings.
While most of the case law relating to the misappropriation doctrine
is of federal origin, since Erie the courts have been applying state law.
It is therefore appropriate to examine the developed body of law of state
courts to determine the role of misappropriation as a form of state
protected intellectual property law.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MISAPPROPRIATION IN
STATE COURTS SINCE ERIE
A. STATES ADOPTING MISAPPROPRIATION
To date, fourteen states have adopted the doctrine of misappro-
priation. The earliest cases were in Missouri and Texas in the
mid-1920's, 142 just a few years after I.N.S.. Unquestionably, New York
is the state that has most heartily embraced the doctrine. There may be
as many misappropriation cases in New York as there are in all of the
rest of the states together. New York cases vary from the famous
Metropolitan Opera case, 143 to the fashion design cases, 144 to the
139. See, e.g., Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 218 N.W.2d 705
(Wis. 1974).
140. See Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
141. Feist, 499 U.S. at 342.
142. See National Tel. Director Co. v. Dawson Mfg. Co., 263 S.W. 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924);
Gilmore v. Sammons, 269 S.W. 861 (Tex. Cir. App. 1925).
143. Metropolitan Opera Assoc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder. 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
affd,107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
144. Margolis v. National Bellas Hess Co., 249 N.Y.S. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931).
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unauthorized public broadcasts of the World Series over leased
telephone lines, 145 and finally to the Madison Square Garden look-alike
case. 146 In no particular order, the other eleven states adopting the
doctrine are Pennsylvania,147 California,14 8 Alaska,149 Colorado, 150
Illinois,15 1 North Carolina152 South Carolina,153 Wisconsin,1 54 New
Jersey,155 Maryland156 and Delaware. 157 In Alaska and Delaware, the
only cases are federal cases, but the federal courts predicted that
misappropriation would be adopted as state law.
The motivation for adopting misappropriation in some of the states
in the 1970s was to address tape piracy where Congress had not yet
acted. 158 In doing so, the state supreme courts nicely illustrated one of
the best arguments for misappropriation as a viable doctrine of
intellectual property. It serves to protect intellectual efforts in fact
patterns fitting no other tort.
So far, misappropriation has been specifically rejected as preempted
only in Massachusetts1 59 and Hawaii. 160 Both cases involved federal
district courts predicting the status of the law of the state as opposed to
the state supreme court adopting or rejecting the doctrine.
145. Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1941).
146. Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co.. 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div.
1938).
147. See, e.g., Waring, 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
148. See, e.g., McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 239 P.2d 32 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
149. See, e.g., Veatch v. Wagner, 109 F. Supp. 537 (D. Alaska 1953) (predicting state law).
150. See, e.g., American Television & Communications Corp. v. Manning, 651 P.2d 440 (Colo.
App. 1982).
151. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc., 439 N.E.2d 526 (I11. App. Ct. 1982).
152. See, e.g., Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 180 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
153. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Custom Recording Co., 189 S.E.2d 305 (S.C.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1973).
154. See, e.g., Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 218 N.W.2d 705 (Wis.
1974).
155. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 341 A.2d 348 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
156. See, e.g., GAI Audio of New York, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 340 A.2d 736
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
157. Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 113 (Del. Ch. 1975)
(adjudicating conflict of law issue and applying New Jersey law); but see National Football League v.
Governor of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 n.2 (D. Del. 1977) (denying recovery but stating that
misappropriation is the law of Delaware).
158. Nearly half of the states adopting misappropriation did so in response to tape piracy before
Congress had provided a copyright remedy, e.g., Wisconsin, North Carolina, South Carolina, Maryland
and New Jersey.
159. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. National Merchandising Corp., 141 N.E.2d 702, 710 (Mass.
1957) (refusing to apply misappropriation for sale of covers to cover up advertising of telephone
directory).
160. Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738 (D. Haw. 1979), (refusing to apply LN.S.
misappropriation to wavy bottom shoes).
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For the most part, the state cases are rather unremarkable in their
discussion of the misappropriation doctrine. The Pennsylvania Fred
Waring case1 61 and the Wisconsin tape piracy case1 62 are perhaps the
most interesting and scholarly ones. However, none of the state cases
achieve the sophisticated rationale of Judge Learned Hand in his many
cases repudiating the doctrine163 or of Judge Higginbotham in his
excellent preemption analysis in Synercom.164
B. FACT PATTERNS OF MISAPPROPRIATION CASES
The attempts to apply misappropriation are as varied as the
imaginations of plaintiffs' counsel. It is therefore somewhat difficult to
categorize the cases. However, a reading of the cases does show distinct
trends. Generally, the cases involving the least successful plaintiffs have
been routine copying of product cases, 165 routine copying of service
cases, 166 cases that are actually trademark cases, 167 and finally, copying
of business ideas or systems. 168 In cases such as these, the courts have
articulated conceptual problems in applying the broad implications of
I.N.S. to products and services that have been voluntarily placed before
the public without restrictions. 169 Typical of such cases is the New York
case of Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, Inc.,170 in
which the plaintiff was prevented from enjoining a defendant from also
making watch crystals where the plaintiff had no patent or other
statutory protection. 171
Plaintiffs have achieved a mixed degree of success in literary work
cases 172 and fashion design cases. 173 Generally, if the literary work
either has been copyrighted or is of the type of subject matter that could
be copyrighted at the time it was fixed, preemption considerations under
161. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
162. Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Economic Consultants. Inc., 218 N.W.2d 705 (Wis. 1974).
163. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
712 (1940); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler. 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1952); National Comics
Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951).
164. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
165. Rahl, supra note 7. at 67 nn. 41-50.
166. Id. at 68.
167. Speedry Prods., Inc. v. Dri-Mark Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1959).
168. See, e.g., Affiliated Enter., Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936).
169. For an excellent discussion of misappropriation and the conceptual difficulties with property
in the public domain see RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, ch. 4, Appropriation of Trade Values.
170. 27 N.E.2d 212 (N.Y. 1940).
171. Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, Inc., 27 N.E.2d 212. 217 (N.Y. 1940).
172. See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. vs. Collectors Publications, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal.
1967); but cf. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952).
173. Compare Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929) with Margolis v.
National Bellas Hess Co., 249 N.Y.S. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1931).
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section 301, title 17 of the United States Code will preclude relief. 174
However, in the unique cases involving not only fixed words, but also
copying of other matters such as layout, type set, and engraving plates,
some courts have granted relief. 175 In fashion design cases, results are
truly mixed with the directly contrary results of state and federal New
York courts best exemplifying the point.176
The most successful misappropriation plaintiffs have been those in
areas factually similar to I.N.S.. Thus, plaintiffs have a reasonable
chance of success if the case involves rebroadcasting hot news items, 177
appropriations of live performances,1 78 or during the 1970's, tape
piracy.179 Unauthorized broadcasts of sporting events have also been
routinely stopped on a misappropriation theory.1 80 Most recently, the
doctrine has been applied in commercial data cases such as stock index
cases. 
181
Generally, underlying all of these decisions, and often predictive of
the outcome, are the nature and extent of preemption issues that arise,
and the nature and extent to which the plaintiff has voluntarily placed
intellectual property in the public domain. The recent Supreme Court
case, Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,182 raises questions about
the distinction sometimes made between simply copying a public
domain object and exact reproduction. In Bonito Boats, the issue was a
Florida statute that prevented plug molding of boat hulls. The plaintiff
argued that the statute was constitutional and was unlike Sears/Compco
in that it only prevented a specific type of copying, i.e. plug molding.
The United States Supreme Court rejected this distinction, and agreed
with the Florida Supreme Court 83 that the statute was unconstitutional,
citing Sears/Compco for its rationale. 184 Bonito Boats would seem to
174. See, e.g., Schuchart & Assocs., Professional v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D.
Tex. 1982) (finding that preemption prevailed over misappropriation claim for architectural plans).
175. See supra note 168.
176. Germanow, 27 N.E.2d at 215, 217.
177. This is closest factually to I.N.S. and perhaps accounts for the greater degree of plaintiffs'
successes.
178. Live performances, particularly of sporting events, are very much analogous to the hot
news cases.
179. GAI Audio of New York, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 340 A.2d 736 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1975).
180. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting, 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Mutual
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1941); National Exhibition Co. v. FASS, 143
N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
181. Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 439 N.E.2d 526 (111. 1982), affd, 456 N.E.2d 84
(1983); Standard & Poors Corp., Inc., v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982).
182. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
183. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,.515 So. 2d 220 (Ha. 1987).
184. Id. at 157.
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make the routine product copying case even more difficult for plaintiffs
seeking to apply the misappropriation doctrine.
V. MISAPPROPRIATION AS STATE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
Having examined the historical development of the misappro-
priation case law, as well as its interplay with federal concepts, one is left
with a distinct feeling that misappropriation does serve a useful purpose,
but its use must be carefully balanced against the preemptive federal
right concepts embodied in patent and copyright law. The balance
between those rights and the concept of public domain property free for
the use of all cannot be upset without a risk of preemption. Most
successful misappropriation cases have not upset this balance, but have
simply kept a wrongdoer from engaging in clearly offensive, inequitable
conduct beyond simple copying. However, the courts' enthusiasm to
stop inequitable conduct should not override the necessary examination
of the balance between what is free and available for all under patent and
copyright law and what is of legitimate state interest for protection.
However, the dividing line between misappropriation and permissi-
ble copying of unpatented or uncopyrighted matter in the public
domain is not clear. Perhaps the line is crossed when the copyist not
only copies, but also takes the other natural fruits of the plaintiffs
labors.185 Thus, copying through reverse engineering or other conduct
involving the copyist's own labor rightfully exercised on a public
domain res might be permissible; but if in copying the copyist also takes
the benefit of the plaintiff's other inherently associated rights, then
misappropriation has occurred. Some examples may be helpful.
In news cases like I.N.S., the defendant has not only taken the
uncopyrightable information but has also taken the economic value of
being first in the marketplace with the news. Since news is of limited
time value, the concept of being first in the marketplace is critical. In the
Metropolitan Opera case, 186 not only the substance of the broadcast was
taken, but also the recording right. In the baseball peeking case,
informational facts of the game were taken, along with the right of
broadcasting for profit. 187 Thus, an intangible res (intellectual property)
often has not only the right of possession of a tangible embodiment, but
185. These associated rights are sometimes referred to as trade values. See Rahl, supra note 7,
at 56.
186. Metropolitan Opera Assoc. v. Wagner, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950), affd, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
187. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting, 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
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also an associated bundle of rights (trade values), at least some of which
equitably should, in the first instance, belong to the originator. After all,
it is within the originator's power to do absolutely nothing with his or her
creation! In this way an incentive to share for the benefit of the public is
provided, without necessarily running afoul of public domain and
preemption concepts of the patent and copyright law.
Viewed in this light, preemption should arise where the originator
has exploited this initial bundle of rights, received some benefit of the
fruits of her labor, and then attempted to stop others, thus reserving to
herself a degree of exclusivity which can and should only arise from
statutory granted rights. Thus, in most cases where a defendant has done
nothing more than copy a publicly sold article, the plaintiff should fail
on a misappropriation theory. Where, however, the defendant has, by
way of example, not only copied but also taken the associated right of
normally being first in the marketplace, the plaintiff should be
successful.
Following such an analysis initially requires examination of the
nature of the intellectual property and its inherently associated bundle of
rights (trade values). These must then be compared to the appropriate
federal law model to determine if preemption is involved. Using this
approach, many future cases can be rationally decided without deciding
the difficult issue of whether Sears/Compco is a correct statement of
preemption, or whether the more moderate views of Goldstein and
Kewanee are correct. Thus only in cases where the appropriated trade
value is not distinct from the res itself would one have to confront
preemption considerations.
The precise bundle of associated rights or trade values will vary,
depending upon the type of intellectual property appropriated. Thus, an
exhaustive list of such rights or trade values is impossible. However,
some of the natural rights inherently possessed by the originator of
intellectual property are the fight to keep it secret, the right to publish it,
the right to initially exploit it, the right to be associated with origination
of the property (reputation), the right to dedicate it to the public, or in
some instances, if it is federally protectible, the right to patent or
copyright it. These rights would seem to exist in every intellectual
property creation. Other rights will be more specific to the various types
of property, such as the right of rebroadcast for sporting events, the
moral right for literary works, and the right of privacy for private letters.
One may well ask whether the states have a legitimate interest in
protecting this natural bundle of rights or trade values normally
associated with the originator's intellectual property. It is a good
question.
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A. LEGITIMATE STATE INTERESTS
Clearly, states have an interest in protecting the intellectual labors of
their citizens, particularly where the subject matter of the intellectual
labor is of peculiar interest to the state. Indeed, Goldstein v. Califor-
niat88 concerned this precise issue. The State of California had an
unquestioned interest in prohibiting tape piracy in view of the strong
economic interest of California in the entertainment industry. The
Supreme Court quickly pointed out that the Constitution neither
explicitly precluded nor granted states the right of copyright. 189 The
same can be said for patents. Indeed, in the very early history of our
country, states routinely granted patents. 190 Thus, in Goldstein the Court
concluded that the states have not relinquished all powers to grant
authors the exclusive right to their respective writings. 191 The same is
true for inventors. One need only examine the early history of state
copyright and patent laws and the current state trade secret statutes to
prove the point.
B. INTELLECTUAL LABORS OF LOCAL STATE INTEREST
Misappropriation would seem to be a natural theory for protecting
intellectual labors that are of peculiar interest to the state. Often these
intellectual labors will have to do with the natural resources of the state
and ancestral heritage of the people of the state. For example, in the
Midwest, row crops and domestic livestock, now both fully capable of
genetic control, are of peculiar interest to the states. In the Dakotas,
Indian heritage is of particular interest and economic value. In
Minnesota, Scandinavian heritage and associated products have
particular value. In Tennessee, music rights are of paramount impor-
tance. In Louisiana, Cajun history has undeniable economic value, and
in the Northwest, in states such as Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, wood
and lumber interests prevail. In Chicago, Illinois, excellent experimental
architecture has historically abounded. In all of these examples, an
intellectual property favoritism of each state toward its own natural
resources and the historical and ancestral heritage of its people, would
seem both logical and permissible under Goldstein.
188. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1974).
189. Id. at 561-62.
190. Id. at 557 n. 13 (making examples of the eighteenth century state patents issued by the states
of Massachusetts. South Carolina, Maryland, and Pennsylvania).
191. See supra notes 96-103 (discussing the state power to grant rights to authors).
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In such cases involving state interests it would seem best to first
leave it to the states to decide what rights they wish to recognize and in
what areas they wish to extend the doctrine of misappropriation.
Thereafter, the federal courts can decide whether or not the state
extensions involve an unreasonable interference with federal patent and
copyright laws.
One cannot today decide with any degree of accuracy what might
be important intellectual property rights tomorrow. Indeed, the Third
Circuit has recognized that misappropriation is flexible enough to "fill
the gap." 192 . Consider, for example, whether or not misappropriation
might be applied to some of the following facts: defacing or modifying
art, intercepting cellular phone signals, reselling art objects, writing
unauthorized biographies, unauthorized dubbing to create duet
performances, colorizing old movies, or making replicas of classic cars
such as the '57 Chevy and the '65 Mustang.
VI. CONCLUSION
Viewed in light of its flexibility and in light of states' rights, it would
seem that misappropriation is a justified doctrine of law. It provides a
flexible balance between labor protection, competition, and preemption.
It is flexible enough to use or reject as needed and to extend the
frontiers of the law to cover conduct generally regarded as inequitable
and unreasonable when directed toward rights associated with intellectual
property created by another. It can be applied without unreasonably
interfering with federally protected competition. The seventy-five year
history of this doctrine demonstrates its worth.
192. United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys. Data Max. 749 F.2d 1028. 1038 (3d Cir. 1984).
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